



CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF 1967

Members of the Historical Security Council of 1967:

Argentina	Ethiopia	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Brazil	France	United Kingdom
Bulgaria	India	United States of America
Canada	Japan	
China	Mali	
Denmark	Nigeria	

ABOUT THE HISTORICAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The 2008 American Model United Nations Historical Security Council (HSC) will simulate the events of the world beginning on 15 March 1967. Historically, the key international security concerns at this time revolve around the situations in Africa, including Southern Rhodesia, the Congo and South Africa. Peacekeeping questions are of significant concern at this time, especially surrounding the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) operation between Egypt and Israel, and the USSR's unwillingness to pay for certain peacekeeping operations. The war in Vietnam is also a key underlying factor in world politics, although it received limited formal attention in the Security Council. Continued disputes over recognition issues between the two Chinas is also a significant issue. Additionally, the Cold War struggles between the United States and the Soviet Union are a constant undercurrent in the world of international politics.

In 1967, U Thant was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Lyndon Johnson was the US President and Leonid Brezhnev was the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Shah's government was in power in Iran and the Republic of China (on Formosa/Taiwan), rather than the mainland People's Republic of China, was officially represented in the United Nations. Cold War tensions were progressively growing at this time, and many of the developing countries were stressing their non-aligned status and forming a power bloc within the United Nations.

AMUN's HSC is unique not only in its topics, but also in its treatment of those topics. History and time are the HSC's media and those media are flexible. In the simulation, the HSC will preempt history from the time the Council's simulation is assigned to begin. History will be as it was written until the moment the Council convenes. From that moment forward, however, Council members exercise free will based on the range of all the choices within their national character and upon the capabilities of their governments.

Effective role-playing for an HSC Member State will be not just a routine replay of national decisions as they evolved in 1967. Indeed, the problems of the era may not transpire as they once did, and this will force active evaluations - and reevaluations - of national policies. Beyond this, it cannot be said that the policy course a government made in 1967 was necessarily the wisest. While role-players must be, by definition, in character, it is not a sure thing that given a second opportunity to look at events - any given national government would do things exactly the same way twice. History

is replete with the musings of foreign ministers and heads of state pinning for second chances.

It will be the job of Council Representatives to actively involve their country's national policies and national capabilities in solutions to the problems and issues that may not have had adequate contemporary resolutions. There is almost always more than one alternative choice in any situation.

In particular, the international community has often chosen not to actively involve itself in many regional disputes or political crises where it might have shown greater involvement. The UN itself has often been a bystander to regional or international conflict. This inability or unwillingness to actively work toward solutions to crises was rarely more evident than during the late years of colonialism and early years of the Cold War. Representatives will need to decide what changes, if any, could have been made to the Security Council's posture on the various issues.

While national governments often did not want international meddling in what they felt to be national policies or disputes, this in no way lessens the responsibility of Council members to make the effort and find ways to actively involve themselves in crisis solutions. This task must, however, be accomplished without violating the bounds of the Member States' national characters. This year's simulation will have the dichotomy of many regional crises being treated as internal by the superpowers, and other crises that are so global in nature that the UN must become involved.

Representatives should approach these issues based on events through the final days of 1966 and early days of 1967, and should do their research accordingly. In studying their role playing assignments, it is strongly recommended that research be done on these topics using timely materials. The world has changed dramatically in the past 40+ years, but none of these changes will be evident within the chambers of the HSC. While histories of the subject will be fine for a general overview, Representatives should pursue periodicals from late 1966 to early 1967 most accurately reflect the worldview at that time. Magazines featuring an overview of that year may give a particularly good feel for the international mood in which the simulation is set. Periodicals contemporary to the period, which can be easily referenced in a Readers Guide to Periodical Literature or the New York Times Index, should provide a much better historical perspective and feel for the times than later historical texts, which can also be useful for general information.

The HSC simulation will follow a flexible time line based on events as they occurred, and modified by the Representatives' policy decisions in the Council. The Secretariat will be responsible for tracking the simulation and keeping it as realistic as possible. In maintaining realism, Representatives must remember that they are role playing the individual assigned as their nation's Representative to the UN. They may have access to the up-to-the-minute policy

decisions of their countries, or they may be relatively in the dark on their countries moment-to-moment actions in the world.

In this area, the AMUN Simulation Staff will frequently consult with HSC members. Representatives are welcome and encouraged, as their nation's spokesperson, to make whatever declarative statements they like. Declarative statements would include any comments or actions (including real or implied threats or deals) that an individual at the UN could normally make. Representatives must, however, always consult with the Simulation Staff before making ANY operational statements. Operational statements would include announcements of the movements or actions of military forces, as well as any other actions that would have an effect outside of the UN. In these cases, the Simulation Staff would be equated with the actual home office of the involved nation(s).

OTHER INVOLVED COUNTRIES

From time-to-time, other countries will be involved in the deliberations of the HSC. Delegations representing these countries will be notified in advance by the Secretariat, and should have one or more Representatives prepared to come before the HSC at any time. Because these countries will not be involved in all issues, it

is highly recommended that the Representative(s) responsible for the HSC also be assigned to another Committee/Council, preferably with a second Representative who can cover that Committee/Council while they are away. A floating Permanent Representative would also be ideal for this assignment. These delegations will be asked to identify their Representative(s) to the HSC at registration, and to indicate where they can be reached if/when needed.

Some of the delegations which may be called before the HSC during the 1967 time frame include: Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, South Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola, among others.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH

The following are brief synopses of the main international situations facing the Security Council on 15 March 1967. The prominent events of late 1966 are discussed, as well as some questions that may face the Security Council in early 1967. This research is intended merely as a focal point for Representatives' continued exploration of the topics.

THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

On 11 November 1965, the minority government of Southern Rhodesia, led by Ian Smith, made a unilateral declaration of independence from the United Kingdom, sparking an intense political conflict. Southern Rhodesia had been a self-administered (by white colonists) territory of the United Kingdom for over 40 years. This declaration was in direct violation of the 1961 decolonization agreement signed between the UK and Southern Rhodesia, in that it ignored the majority black population of Zimbabwe. The Council requested on 20 November 1965 that all UN members make a voluntary break in diplomatic and economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. On 16 December of that year, a follow-up resolution imposed selected mandatory economic sanctions. In April of 1966, following months of failed diplomatic efforts driven mainly by the UK, that government requested a Council meeting to consider the incident of a Portuguese oil tanker which was attempting to make a delivery of much needed oil to the Southern Rhodesian government. The UK had been given broad latitude by its Council allies to attempt a diplomatic solution to the problems caused by its former colony, and bringing this issue before the Council marked a new stage in the conflict. At the UK's request, the resolution eventually that was passed allowed for use of force by the UK to prevent shipments covered under the previous embargo from reaching Southern Rhodesia.

Several African nations spoke before the Council on this issue, requesting much stronger measures up to and including the authorization of Chapter VII enforcement against Rhodesia. The United States and France joined the UK, however, in opposing Chapter VII action and allowing the UK to lead any enforcement measures. On 10 May, 32 African nations requested a Council meeting to discuss again the Southern Rhodesian issue. These nations noted that, to date, Council measures had been ineffective in removing the minority government, and made a further push for UN intervention, including Chapter VII authorization. The request noted that economic

sanctions were clearly failing as not all states were enforcing these sanctions, and some states were still investing in Southern Rhodesia. In discussions on the issue, the USSR specifically accused the UK of trying to reach an agreement with the Smith regime at the expense of the Zimbabwean people. A resolution, sponsored by the African bloc and reflecting its concerns, failed by a vote of six in favor, one opposed and eight abstentions. Similar discussions continued throughout the year on these issues, leading up to an eventual request by the UK for another Council meeting in December. At this time, the UK was prepared to call for additional measures against Southern Rhodesia, including stronger economic sanctions.

During the debate on the subject, other states criticized UK enforcement efforts. Further, the refusal of the UK to use force, as it had been partially authorized to do at its own request, was criticized by a number of speakers. It was at this point increasingly obvious that the UK's goal was not to attack Rhodesia or remove the Smith regime, but instead to come to some kind of agreement with Smith. Significantly, the Western powers had, by this point, realized that the situation was becoming more intractable as time went on. An amendment sponsored by the African states noted that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security and was included in the text of the final resolution. The Chapter VII language had been staunchly opposed by the UK and its allies in past discussions. The final resolution on the subject passed by a vote of 11 in favor, none opposed and four abstentions. This is the point at which the situation stands in early 1967.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Does your country support greater enforcement measures to remove control from the minority-led government in Southern Rhodesia? How far should these measures go, how would such measures be carried out, and by whom? How would these measures be financed?

- Does your country still trade with or invest in Southern Rhodesia? If so, does your government plan to comply with Security Council-passed sanctions and cease any illegal trading?
- How can a smooth transition to a majority led, post-colonial government best be accomplished in Southern Rhodesia?

THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE

The Security Council considered actions taken from the Israeli, Syrian and Jordanian sides of the Armistice in the Palestine region throughout 1966. Repeated border incursions and military incidents continued to lead to heightened tensions in the region throughout the year. Syria and Jordan frequently accused Israel of violating the Armistice by attacking their respective territories, and Israel accused Syria of continued attacks from the Golan Heights, and both Syria and Jordan of military activities across various border regions. Israel also accused both countries of harboring pro-Palestinian El-Fatah and El-Asefa terrorists, who frequently conducted terrorist activities across the Israeli border, and accused Syria of arming and training these groups, suggesting that their status was more in line with irregular troops directed by the Syrian government, rather than independent organizations. On 25 February a military coup in Syria returned Nureddin Atassi to power, and from February to October numerous incursions occurred across the Syrian-Israeli border. Israel accused Syria of numerous actions taken against Israeli settlements, frequently from fortified positions on the Golan Heights, and apparently in an effort to disrupt the daily lives of farmers and fisherman. In recent activities, a report was made in August that Syrian forces fired on an Israeli patrol boat, with Israeli retaliation for this action resulting in the downing of two Syrian jet fighters. In September, there was a report of Syrian forces firing on an Israeli fishing boat, and reports in October that four Israeli border policemen had been killed by a Syrian mine, and that a tractor driver had been fired on by Syrian artillery. In each case, Israel used the situation to justify military reprisals, while Syria argued that the original attacks were fabrications, and that subsequent Israeli attacks were clear violations of the 1949 Armistice Agreements.

On the Israeli-Jordanian border, a number of smaller border incursions culminated in a 13 November invasion by Israeli forces, reportedly at brigade strength, into the southern Hebron region of Jordan. Israeli forces attacked a number of villages in this region, in what Israeli officials called reprisals for Jordanian cross-border interventions and sponsorship of El-Fatah forces, and what Jordan called an unprovoked attack. This was the only event in the region throughout 1966 resulting in formal Security Council action, as Resolution 228 (28 November) criticized the large scale and carefully planned military action on the territory of Jordan by Israeli armed forces, and further censured Israel for its actions. While some states had expressed condemnation of Israel verbally, this was not formally stated in the final resolution.

In other Council actions, the various belligerents in the region were called to speak before the Council several times as hostilities occurred throughout 1966, including Israel, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, the United Arab Republic of Egypt (UAR), and Saudi Arabia.

Several other recent issues contributed to the heightening of tensions surrounding the Palestine issue. On 19 May, a sale of military jet fighters and bombers by the US to Israel was, for the first time ever,

publicly disclosed. Additionally, on 4 November, Syria and the UAR concluded a mutual defense treaty, which also provided for joint control of armed forces in case of war or aggression against either party. Adding to the tension of the region were the efforts of the Soviet Union to unite the Arab states to act against Israel. The Soviet Union had been aligned with Syria since the Suez Canal Dispute and had maintained an active political presence in the region. Most of their political pressure was focused on aligning the other Arab states to act against Israel, including the country of Jordan since they had a significant Palestinian-Arab population not always friendly to the government. Arab unity was further shaken by a 7 December call by Syria - to Jordanians and Palestinian Arabs within Jordan - for the ouster of King Hussein of Jordan. This call was accompanied by an offer to provide arms to any parties involved in the uprising.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- Is your country closely allied with one or more countries involved in the Palestine question? How is this involvement reflected in both your country's public statements and private actions with regard to the region?
- What actions can be taken to better ensure compliance with the 1949 Armistice Agreements by all sides?
- What actions can be taken to reduce the rising tensions on all sides within the region?
- What can the Council realistically do when Armistice violations occur? Is UN military action an option in this conflict?

THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Following its independence from Belgium in 1960, the Republic of the Congo (hereafter referred to as Congo in this paper) went through four years of civil war with significant United Nations and international intervention. This included the ONUC (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo) peacekeeping effort, which lasted from July 1960 to June 1964. While the UN forces departed peacefully after the internal Congo situation had settled in 1964, interactions between the Congo and the bordering Portuguese colony of Angola brought that country to the Council's attention again in the fall of 1965.

On 21 September, the Congolese government accused Portugal of supporting former (now exiled) Congo Prime Minister Tshombe by allowing the use of its territories in Angola and Cabinda as a base for insurgent activities into the Congo. In an apparent response to these insurgencies, the Portuguese embassy in Kinshasa was attacked on 24 September, with Congolese radio responsible for inciting much of the violence.

The Security Council, at Congo's request, considered this matter from 30 September through 14 October. The Congo argued that Portugal was supporting these rebels because the Congolese government had recognized *de jure* the Angolan government in exile, while Portugal denied any support for the insurgents. On 14 October, the Council passed Resolution 226, urging Portugal not to allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operations into neighboring countries. While the political negotiations involved in this resolution appear to have quieted the area, it is possible that renewed conflict could emerge in the future.

An additional issue in the Congo complicating the situation at this time is the coup in November that established military rule and firmly placed Joseph Mobutu in control of the country.

Questions to consider from your government's perspective on this issue include:

- What incentives can be given to prevent further cross-border interventions in this area?
- If incentives and Council resolutions are not successful, what actions can and should the Council take to bring a peaceful resolution to the simmering potential for renewed conflict in and around the Congo?

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

The early 1960s saw North Vietnam's involvement in the two-year civil war in neighboring Laos, as well as increased North Vietnamese incursions into South Vietnam. The United States first sent advisors to the country in 1955, and started to build up significant ground troops in 1965, leading to significantly increased tensions in the region.

In January of 1966 the US reported taking new steps toward achieving peace in Vietnam. While the US continued to stress the importance of South Vietnamese self-determination, they also suggested that it would be ideal for all parties to agree on and to implement the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. The Vietnam issue had never previously been discussed by the Security Council, but in an effort to bring the international political arena to bear in this direction, the US called for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss this issue on 31 January. At this meeting, the US argued that a new dimension in peace was possible, and suggested that the Council assist in brokering an attempt to arrange a new Conference to apply the Geneva Accords.

The US attempt to work through the Council was opposed on many sides. Secretary-General U Thant specifically opposed open debate of the issue before the Council, noting the problematic nature of US influence in Council involvement. Thant suggested that, since the original Geneva Accords were negotiated outside of a United Nations context, that any new negotiations based on these accords were not properly within the purview of the UN. The USSR also opposed open discussion in the Council, apparently not wanting the US to use the Council for its own purposes in the war effort. Additionally, France (which was involved in Vietnam before the US presence there) also opposed these discussions, citing the problematic effect of the US being the only party to the conflict that was a UN member, and the fact that this would deny a voice to the two parts of Vietnam and to mainland China.

Following a contentious vote on 2 February (nine in favor, two opposed, four abstentions) to add the item to the Council's agenda, actual talks proved less than meaningful. A letter from the Council President, explaining the discussions, noted the failure of all parties to the dispute to meet with the Council as the key factor in the Council not reaching any formal decision. In general, the President noted that the members expressed a general concern over continued hostilities in the region. This minimal statement was criticized by several Council members, who argued that the discussions had been strictly procedural, and that the President should not have drawn any conclusions from the statements made. While a number of reports were made by the Secretary-General and various members throughout

the year on the situation in Vietnam, after February it was not again considered in formal discussions.

OTHER ISSUES

PEACEKEEPING ISSUES

United Nations peacekeeping was rocked in 1966 by the continuing refusal of the Soviet Union to pay for costs incurred for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and in ONUC. The Soviets considered these operations to be politically motivated in unacceptable directions, and refused payment. Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, Soviet voting rights in the General Assembly could be removed if it was more than two years behind in its mandatory payments to the organization. The key question this raised was of the voluntary nature of peacekeeping payments, versus the collective financial responsibility usually assumed for peacekeeping activities. The politicization of peacekeeping could reflect significantly on the planning processes for continuing and future operations.

A further issue impacting peacekeeping was the question of whether the United Nations should intervene in the situations in South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia. These complex issues, leading to widely varying views among the Permanent Members, have left both situations somewhat in limbo with regards to the possibility of UN actions beyond economic embargoes.

THE QUESTION OF THE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA

The representation of China continued to be an underlying issue effecting many UN discussions, with the Republic of China on Formosa/Taiwan retaining the General Assembly and Security Council seat allocated to China. Discussions about this issue occurred between August and November of 1966, mainly in the General Assembly. These revolved around questions such as the war in Vietnam, in which the People's Republic of China's involvement and lack of UN membership was becoming an increasingly important issue, as well as various other political and trade issues in dealing with the increasingly powerful mainland government. A key question raised by allies of the Formosa government was what would happen to Taiwan if the seat were to be awarded to the mainland government, both in terms of UN representation and its future relations with other countries.

THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

The United Nations first became involved in Cyprus in 1964 with the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on 4 March. Peacekeeping troops were sent in response to the escalating violence between the Greek and Turkish factions on Cyprus that had been spreading across the island since 21 December of the previous year. Greek and Turkish extremists had been fighting over Cyprus since it gained independence from the British in 1959. Compromises that occurred during the formation of the constitution angered both Greek Cypriots, who were in favor of reuniting with Greece, and Turkish Cypriots, who were in favor of dividing the island between the two groups. To aid in peacekeeping efforts, the

Security Council recommended that the Secretary General appoint a mediator to oversee formal peacekeeping efforts. The chaotic situation on Cyprus, however, prevented any substantive talks from happening and Cyprus entered 1967 in much the same way it had entered the previous year with little hope for peace. In December of 1966, the Security Council passed Resolution 231 extending the UN peacekeeping force until June of 1967.

OTHER OPEN ISSUES

Any issue on the world scene in 1967 will be open for discussion in the Historical Security Council. Representatives should have broad historical knowledge of the world situation as it stood through 15 March 1967.

Bibliography:

Please note: The books and documents listed below provide both contemporary and historical information on the year 1966. Any information provided for dates after 15 March 1967 will not be considered factual or appropriate in debates before the Council.

It is strongly recommended that representatives to the Historical Security Council consult contemporary materials, especially periodical sources from late 1966. These might include the *UN Chronicle*, the *New York Times*, *Time Magazine*, and similar sources to get a better feel for the time in which the simulation occurs.

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UN Documents, Southern Rhodesia:

- S/RES/232 (16 Dec 66)
S/RES/221 (9 Apr 66)
S/RES/217 (20 Nov 65)
S/RES/216 (12 Nov 65)

UN Documents, Palestine:

- S/RES/228 (25 Nov 66)
S/7573, SG's Report to Security Council (2 Nov 66)
S/7572, SG's Report to Security Council (1 Nov 66)
S/7561/Rev.1, SG's Report to Security Council (19 Oct 66)
S/7533, SG's Report to Security Council (17 Oct 66)
S/7433, SG's Report to Security Council (25 Jul 66)
S/7432, SG's Report to Security Council (25 Jul 66)
A/6302, Report of the Security Council to GA, Chapter 20 (15 Jul 66)

UN Documents, Republic of the Congo:

- S/RES/226 (14 Oct 66)
S/7524, Letter from Congo (3 Oct 66)
S/7506, Letter from Portugal (24 Sep 66)
S/7503, Letter from Congo (21 Sep 66)

UN Documents, Vietnam:

- A/6400, Letter from SG (1 Sep 66)
A/6302, Report of Security Council to GA, Chapter 18 (15 Jul 66)
A/6301/Add.1, SG's Annual Report (15 Jun 66)
S/7168, Letter from President of Security Council (26 Feb 66)

UN Documents, Cyprus:

- S/RES/231 (15 Dec 1966)
S/6253, Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary General (26 March 65)
S/RES/186 (4 Mar 1964)